We present a round addition differential fault analysis (DFA) for some lightweight 80-bit block ciphers. It is shown that only one correct ciphertext and two faulty ciphertexts are required to reconstruct secret keys in 80-bit Piccolo and TWINE, and the reconstructions are easier than 128-bit CLEFIA. key words: differential fault analysis (DFA), round addition, block cipher, piccolo, TWINE
Introduction
Differential fault analysis (DFA) using operation bypassing is an effective attack technique for cipher-implemented microcontroller [1] . On the basis of this technique, we have shown that round addition DFA using a bypassing increment or decrement command is effective for attacks against cipher-implemented microcontrollers. Further, by supplying abnormal voltage, secret keys of DES and 128-bit CLEFIA can be derived using round addition DFA [2] . Recently, many lightweight block ciphers have been proposed for low-resource devices. Both Piccolo and TWINE employ generalized Feistel networks (GFN) [3] , [4] . Thus, to maintain hardware security, their vulnerability to DFA using operation bypassing and weakness in post-whitening must be evaluated.
For round addition DFA, each round addition requires one operation bypassing.
Here, the n times round operation for data encryption is denoted by "Round 1 | · · · |Round n−2 |Round n−1 |Round n ". The round addition at round (n−1) is represented by "Round 1 | · · · |Round n−2 |Round n−1 |Round n−1 |Round n " where the added operation is denoted in boldface. In our previous result for 128bit CLEFIA [2] , not only the above operation bypassing, but also two operation bypassing is required in one cipher operation to obtain two faulty cipher operations, that is, "Round 1 | · · · |Round n−2 |Round n−1 |Round n−1 |Round n−1 | Round n ". Experimental results show that the success rate of this double operation bypassing is much lower than that of single operation bypassing.
In this study, we present a round addition DFA for two lightweight block ciphers, 80-bit Piccolo and TWINE. It is shown that only one correct ciphertext and two faulty ciphertexts generated by two round additions are required to reconstruct the secret keys of both block ciphers by the following two operation bypassing, "Round 1 |· · ·|Round n−2 |Round n−1 |Round n−1 |Round n ", and "Round 1 |· · ·|Round n−2 |Round n−2 |Round n−1 |Round n ". Thus, the attack against both ciphers is easier than 128-bit CLEFIA.
Round Addition DFA on 80-bit Piccolo
Here, the secret key reconstruction method for 80-bit Piccolo is displayed [3] . The encryption process is shown in Fig. 1 . Each 16-bit round key and whitening key are denoted by rk i and wk i , respectively. The following notations are used. C = V|X|Y|Z: a 64-bit correct ciphertext constructed by the concatenation of four 16-bit data. 
Here, A 1 and A 2 are the upper order byte and lower order byte of two-byte data A, respectively. Substituting X = X 23 ⊕ rk 48 ⊕ F(V 23 ) in Eqs. (1) and (2), we obtain
The whitening keys are given by wk 2 = k 4,1 |k 3,2 and wk 3 = k 3,1 |k 4,2 , and the round key rk 46 is given by k 4 ⊕ con 46 . From Eqs. (3) and (4), the round key rk 48 is obtained from
where con i is a 16-bit i-th constant. The above round key rk 48 is given by k 0 ⊕con 48 . Second, we can see the following relations from Figs. 1 and 2
By adding Eq. (8) to Eqs. (6) and (7), we obtain
From the 22nd round addition shown in Fig. 3 , we can see
By adding Eq. (11) to Eqs. (6) and (7), we obtain The round keys rk 45 and rk 47 are given by k 3 ⊕ con 45 and k 4 ⊕ con 47 , respectively. From Eqs. (9), (10), (12), and (13), we obtain
Using Eqs. (14)-(17), the keys k 3 and k 4 can be solved by 2 32 brute force calculation. Thus, the round keys rk 45 , rk 46 , and rk 47 are determined. Third, the derivation of rk 49 is shown. The relation V 23,1 |Y 23,2 ⊕ F(V ⊕ wk 3 ) ⊕ rk 49 = Z is given by Fig. 2 . After determining wk 2 and wk 3 by the above procedure, we obtain
where the round key rk 49 is given by k 1 ⊕ con 49 . Finally, the derivation of rk 44 is shown. From Figs. 2, and 3, we can see the following relations.
Adding Eqs. (19) and (20), we obtain
where the round key rk 44 is given by k 2 ⊕ con 44 . By the above procedure, the secret key k 0 , . . . , k 4 can be completely derived. In 80-bit Piccolo, all round data at the final round are whitened. The number of rounds is 25, but if this is set to 26, the key cannot be derived by the above procedure.
Round Addition DFA on 80-bit TWINE
The key schedule of 80-bit TWINE is shown in Fig. 4 , and the encryption process is shown in Fig. 5 . Each 16-bit round key and whitening key are denoted by rk i and wk i , respectively. The following notations are used. C = C 36,0 | · · · |C 36, f : a 64-bit correct ciphertext constructed by the concatenation of sixteen 4-bit data. C i,0 , · · · , C i, f : each i-th round output of the above correct ciphertext C = C 36,0 | · · · |C 36, f : 35th round added a faulty ciphertext C = C 36,0 | · · · |C 36, f : 34th round added a faulty ciphertext
The secret key can be derived by i-th 20 subkeys from wk 0,i to wk 19,i in Fig. 4 .
Thus, we must find the 24 round keys RK 36,0 , . . . , RK 36,7 , RK 35,0 , . . . , RK 35,7 , and RK 34,0 , . . . , RK 34,7 . Using the S-box S (·), the F-function is 
Solving Eqs. (38)-(45), the eight round keys RK 34,0 , . . . , RK 34,7 can be obtained. By the above result, in TWINE, the secret key can be derived because all round data at the final round are not whitened. This is similar to 128-bit CLEFIA [2] .
